Matters Pertaining to the Civil Code by Daggett, Harriet S.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 5 | Number 1
December 1942
Matters Pertaining to the Civil Code
Harriet S. Daggett
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Harriet S. Daggett, Matters Pertaining to the Civil Code, 5 La. L. Rev. (1942)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol5/iss1/18
Matters Pertaining to the Civil Code
HARRIET S. DAGGETT*
A. AMENDMENTS TO SPECIFIC CODAL ARTICLES
It appears that the 1942 regular session of the legislature
made but four express changes so far as specific articles of the
Civil Code are concerned.
Article 915 Amended by Act 82 of 1942. In 1938 Article 915
was amended by Act 408 which provided that:
"Should the deceased leave no descendants, but a father and
mother, or either, then the share of the deceased in the com-
munity estate shall be divided in two equal portions, one of
which shall go to the father and mother or the survivor of
them, and the other portion shall go to surviving spouse, who
shall inherit as a legal heir by operation of law, and without
the necessity of compliance with the forms of law provided in
this chapter for the placing of irregular heirs in possession of
the successions to which they are called."
It was assumed in the absence of interpretation by the su-
preme court, that the blessings of the doctrine of Le Mort Saisit
le Vif had been conferred upon the surviving spouse when in-
heritor of community property whether the whole share of the
deceased was transmitted, in the absence of children or parents
or whether only one-half of the deceased one-half of the com-
munity was inherited by the spouse--due to the presence of par-
ent or parents of the deceased.1 Act 82 of 1942 added the clause
shown below in the writer's italics, making the article appear as
follows:
"(915) When either husband or wife shall die, leaving
neither a father nor mother nor descendants, and without hav-
ing disposed by last will and testament of his or her share of
the community property, such undisposed of share shall be
* Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Fabre-Surveyer, The Civil Law in Quebec and Louisiana (1939) 1
LOUISIANA LAW REVIW 649, 661; Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legisla-
tion of 1938 (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 80, 86; Comment (1941) 15 Tu-
lane L. Rev. 576, 581.
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inherited by the surviving spouse in full ownership. In the
event the deceased leave descendants, his or her share in the
community estate shall be inherited by such descendants in
the manner provided by law. Should the deceased leave no
descendants, but a father and mother, or either, then the share
of the deceased in the community estate shall be divided in
two equal portions, one of which shall go to the father and
mother or the survivor of them, and the other portion shall go
to the surviving spouse, who, together with father or mother
inheriting in the absence of descendants, as provided above,
shall inherit as a legal heir by operation of law, and without
the necessity of compliance with the forms of law provided in
this chapter for the placing of irregular heirs in possession of
the successions to which they are called."
Since the language of the 1938 act seemed clear and its pur-
pose definite, the writer was in serious doubt regarding the legis-
lative intent of this amendment. Certainly the purpose of the
added clause could not have been to make regular heirs of the
parents, as they have always been not only regular but forced in
the absence of children. Did the amendment then indicate that
the spouse becomes a regular heir only when he or she inherits
"together with" the parent or parents? Obviously, the clause
placing the surviving spouse in the "regular" category only ap-
peared in the sentence ordering the sharing of the property with
the parent or parents even in the 1938 act, so the assumption that
the surviving spouse would be a regular heir whether inheriting
all or a part of the deceased one-half might have been erroneously
made from the start if a strained interpretation were placed upon
the act. There is greater reason for making the spouse a regular
heir when claiming with the parent or parents so as not to neces-
sitate two different procedures, but not sufficient reason, it would
seem, to warrant a confusing and useless distinction. On the other
hand, the 1942 legislature might have intended only to smooth the
language of the 1938 act and have had no desire to make the
spouse a regular heir in one case and not in the other. The latter
view certainly seemed more probable and more reasonable.
Again, it might be that the lawgivers feared that the language of
the 1938 act might give room for arguing even such a radical in-
terpretation as would claim to exclude the father and mother. In
the midst of these doubts and fears the writer sent a communica-
tion to Senator W. D. Cotton, the proponent of this bill, asking
him for a statement of legislative intent. Though the Senator is
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now a Captain in the United States Army, he was kind enough
to send a clear exposition and to permit the writer to quote that
his very definite purpose was to make the surviving spouse a
regular heir in every case where he or she inherits community
property from the deceased spouse. The purpose of amending
and reenacting was to make certain the regular heirship, with
consequent lack of necessity for the procedure attendant upon
claiming as an irregular heir, as it seemed that some members of
the bar and bench were doubtful that the 1938 act accomplished
that simplification and were adhering to the old procedure. Sena-
tor Cotton makes the following statement:
"It was the very definite purpose of this Act to remove any
possible doubt created by the jurisprudence, and to definitely
establish the surviving spouse a regular heir in all cases when
community property was inherited from the deceased spouse.
. ..The Legislative intent was . . . to make said surviving
spouse a regular heir in all cases, and particularly to obviate
the necessity of the proceedings of an irregular succession."
(Letter from Captain W. D. Cotton, dated New Orleans, Octo-
ber 7, 1942.)
This statement makes certain the intent of the legislature in
passing the 1942 amendment, and should make doubly certain
the already obvious meaning of the 1938 act reenacted and
amended by the 1942 legislature.
Article 1749 Repealed by Act 187 of 1942. Article 1749 pro-
vided that:
"All donations made between married persons, during mar-
riage, though termed inter vivos, shall always be revocable.
"The revocation may be made by the wife, without her be-
ing authorized to that effect by her husband, or by a court
of justice."
The second paragraph was rendered less important after its
incorporation into the series of so-called married women's eman-
cipatory acts (1916-1928). The new act does not purport to amend
Article 1749 but specifically repeals it and provides that gifts by
one spouse to the other "shall be irrevocable, as fully and to the
same effect as if made to a stranger ... ." A further provision
makes it possible for the donor to reserve the right to revoke if
his donation is made by notarial act. Again, he may later revoke
his reservation by notarial act, if he should care to do so. The
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clear purpose of the act is to provide escape from Federal Estate
Taxes, held collectible on revocable gifts.'
Article 156 is specifically protected by the new act. That ar-
ticle provides that the spouse at fault shall lose and the vindi-
cated spouse shall retain all "advantages and donations" made by
one spouse to the other "by marriage contract or since" in case of
separation of bed and board. It has been held that this law being
''eminently conducive to public order and good morals" should
override a provision agreed to by the parties in their marriage
contract.8 As to gifts made during marriage, since they were re-
vocable anyway under 1749, an interesting question might have
been presented as to whether 156 would apply if by chance the
virtuous one should have been generous enough not to have ex-
ercised the revocatory power. However that might have been,
the question of present interest pertinent to the new act is wheth-
er or not the possibility of revocation under 156 is remote enough
to render the otherwise irrevocable interspousal gifts safe from
the Federal Estate Tax.
Article 3369 Amended by Act 213 of 1942. The 1942 addition
to Article 3369 provides that, in cases of failure to record mort-
gages and privileges in a special book with special index as here-
tofore directed by law, recordation in the Mortgage Book of the
Parish in which the property is situated will have the same force
and effect.
Article 3547 Amended by Act 73 of 1942. Article 3547 ap-
peared in the Code of 1870. The first and last sentences have re-
mained the same through the years. These statements lay down
for either state or out of state money judgments a prescriptive
period of ten years from rendition: give a ten year period for
judgments revived and give holders the right to revive as many
times as desired.
In 19364 a sentence was inserted which provides that no pre-
scribed out of state judgment will be enforced, thus making it
clear as to out of state judgments that while in Louisiana the ten
year period might have the effect of shortening the life of a
foreign judgment, it will in no case be applied to lengthen it.
This portion of the 1936 act is retained. The remaining portion of
2. Howard v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 697 (D. C. La. 1941), 125 F.
(2d) 986 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942). See note (1942) 16 Tulane L. Rev. 474.
3. Ledoux v. Her Husband, 10 La. Ann. 633 (1855).
4. La. Act 278 of 1936, § 1. Also see Louisiana State Law Institute, Louisi-
ana Statutes Related to the Civil Code (1942) 707.
[Vol. V
LEGISLATION OF 1942
the article deals with revival of judgments by issue of citation.
According to the 1870 provision and the 1942 provision this cita-
tion must issue from the court which rendered the judgment
rather than from the court of defendant's domicile as provided in
1936. Furthermore, the original and 1942 acts speak in terms of a
party interested in any unprescribed judgment initiating the re-
vival process while the 1936 act spoke of a party interested in
any judgment "rendered within or without the state and not pre-
scribed in the state wherein rendered."
B. STATUTES RELATED' TO THE CIVIL CODE
(a) Of Authentic Acts (Article 2234 et sequor) and Of Copies
of Titles (Articles 2267 et sequor. Also see A Compilation of Lou-
isiana Statutes Related' to the Civil Code, p. 304).
Act 32 of 1942, while not expressly amending a code article or
any other statute, closely affects the above indicated subsections
of the code, as well as certain statutes. It provides "that every
deed, conveyance, mortgage, sale, lease, transfer, assignment,
power of attorney or other instrument whatsoever, and every
oath, affirmation or acknowledgment" made before a commis-
sioned officer of the United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps or
Coast Guard and two witnesses while serving in any foreign
country will have the force and effect of an authentic act executed
in Louisiana. No witnesses are required for "simple affidavits,
oaths and affirmations." After deposit in the office of a Parish
Recorder, the latter is authorized to make copies having the same
force and effect as authentic acts. In the third section it is stated
that the rights conferred by the act are "in addition and supple-
mental to the rights conferred by existing laws" and no delimi-
tations the one by the other are to be inferred. A rule of liberal
construction is enunciated to further the express purpose of facili-
tating the affairs of persons in foreign service. Act 192 of 19185 is
similar in content and purpose, less elaborate, and makes no pro-
vision for copies.
(b) Repeal (Articles 22-23. Also see A Compilation of Lou-
isiana Statutes Related to the Civil Code, pp. 1-5).
Act 35 of 1942 deals with repeal and provides
"That the repeal of any statute shall not have the effect of
releasing or extinguishing any penalty, forfeiture or liability,
5. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6289. Also see Louisiana State Law Institute,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 304.
1942]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
civil or criminal, incurred under such statute unless the re-
pealing act shall expressly so provide, and such statute shall
be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sus-
taining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement
of such penalty, forfeiture or liability."
(c) Emancipation (Articles 385-388. Also see A Compilation
of Louisiana Statutes Related to the Civil Code, p. 133).
Act 71 of 1942 provides that, when a non-resident minor over
eighteen petitions the court of the district of the minor's principal
establishment in Louisiana and presents a foreign judgment of
emancipation, the decree must be given the same force as a judi-
cial emancipation issued by a Louisiana court in the case of a resi-
dent minor.
(d) Privileges on Oil, Gas, and Water Wells (Of Privileges,
Articles 3182-3277. See A Compilation of Louisiana Statutes Re-
lated to the Civil Code, pp. 579-587, and Daggett on Louisiana
Privileges dnd Chattel Mortgage, c. VII, p. 486.)
Act 68 of 1942 rewrites the statute creating a privilege for the
benefit of laborers, materialmen and others on oil, gas and water
wells, the lease on which they are located, oil stored thereon and
all appurtenances thereto. Acts 145 of 19346 and 100 of 19407 deal-
ing with this subject are specifically repealed. Besides clarifying
the language of the old acts, and inserting certain words which
make more certain the classes of persons affected, the new statute
provides in Section 1 that the privilege be extended to cover the
cost of preparing as well as recording the privilege and for "ten
per cent attorney's fees in the event it becomes necessary to em-
ploy an attorney to enforce collection." Section 2 contains a new
provision for suspension of the ninety day prescriptive period so
long as the persons protected continue to furnish labor, services,
fuel, materials and supplies, to the same owner, operator, producer
or driller, in the same field where the origirnal claim arose upon
other wells. The notice of the claim must contain a description of
the leased property such as to make it reasonably identifiable. That
portion of the old act requiring that the person making provisional
seizure must make oath that he verily believes that the lease is
about to be abandoned and/or the equipment sold or removed,
6. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) §§ 5101.1-5101.5n. Also see Louisiana State
Law Institute, op. cit. supra note 4, at 581.
7. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) §§ 5101.1-5101.5n. Also see Louisiana State
Law Institute, op. cit. supra note 4, at 584.
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has been deleted, the new act in Section 4 only requiring oath of
the amount due.
(e) Attorney at Law (See A Compilation of Louisiana Sta-
tutes Related to the Civil Code, p. 102.)
Act 74 of 1942. In 1918,8 the legislature by Act 219 authorized
the appointment by the judge having jurisdiction, of an attorney
at law to represent absentees, minors and interdicted persons
without the necessity of designating the appointee by any special
title in order to make the representation legally effective. A
second section of the act provided that after six months no legal
proceeding would be rendered. invalid by virtue of an incorrect
designation of the representative if that was the sole ground of
nullity. In 1926, by Act 133, 9 the legislature made it clear that the
statute only pertained to those who were not already represented
and deleted the section of the previous statute giving the six
months prescriptive period. Act 74 of 1942 further amends by
authorizing either the judge "or the Clerk of the Court in which
the proceedings are filed" to make the appointment of this at-
torney at law.
(f) Evidence (See A Compilation of Louisiana Statutes Re-
lated to the Civil Code, p. 306.)
Act 70 of 1942 provides that enactments, regulations, decis-
ions, rulings, proceedings, reports
"or other official acts, of the Congress or any Federal executive
department or subdivision therein, or of any Federal Court or
commission or board or agency or public institution, may be
evidenced by the Federal Register or by a printed book or
pamphlet or periodical purporting to be published by the U. S.
Government Printing Office at Washington, D. C., by author-
ity, which shall be received in all courts and proceedings of
this State and by all officers of this State as prima facie evi-
dence of the records, documents, enactments, regulations, de-
cisions, rulings, proceedings, reports or other official acts of
the departments, subdivisions, courts, commissions, boards,
agencies or public institutions from which they purport to
emanate, and the same may be read and referred to as such in
any and all courts of this State."
8. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9724.
9. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9724. Also see Louisiana State Law Institute, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 103.
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(g) Unfair Sales. (See A Compilation of Louisiana Statutes
Related to the Civil Code, p. 288.)
Act 79 of 1942. Section 2 of Act 338 of 1940 designated by the
legislature as the Unfair Sales Act, was amended by Act 79 of
1942 to include the following:
"(c) In determining 'cost to the retailer' in those cases
where the retailer buys at wholesale and receives the whole-
salers' profits and discounts on merchandise to be sold at re-
tail, both the wholesale markup of two (2) per cent and the
retail markup of six (6) per cent shall be added to cover a pro-
portionate part of the cost of doing business, in the absence of
proof of a lesser cost."
(h) Illegitimates (Articles 202-213; 256. See A Compilation
of Louisiana Statutes Related to the Civil Code, p. 86.)
Act 91 of 1942. Act 271 of 194010 conferred upon the unmar-
ried mother, whether twenty-one years of age or under, the right
to legally surrender her child to institutions or social agencies ap-
proved by the State Department of Public Welfare, by executing
a release before a Notary Public and two witnesses; provided the
approved agency consented to take the care, custody and control
of the child. More specialized procedure for mothers under
twenty-one was set forth necessitating a thirty-day notice to the
State Department of Public Welfare by the agency who was to re-
ceive the child and requiring judicial authorization of the mother
to make the release. After such release the receiving agency was
given the right to act, as the legal custodian of the child, in plac-
ing him for adoption. Act 91 of 1942 permits the mother to sur-
render the child either to an approved social agency, or to the
juvenile court willing to receive him. The specialized procedure
for mothers under twenty-one found in the 1940 act has been de-
leted, and Section 4 of the new act purports to cover all surren-
ders made by minor mothers unless action be brought within
ninety days after the effective date of the 1942 act.
(i) Live Birth (Article 963).
Act 180 of 1942. This act authorizes "the State Board of
Health to create a central Division of Public Health Statistics for
the purpose of securing complete data pertaining to births, legiti-
mations, adoptions, deaths, stillbirths, morbidity, marriages, di-
vorces, and annulments of marriages; to authorize and regulate
10. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 4895.1.
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the use of vital statistics records as evidence; to authorize the
State Board of Health to make regulations for the enforcement of
this act, the Parish of Orleans and the City of New Orleans ex-
cepted." The act contains some provisions which touch the ar-
ticles of the Code since the certificates to be issued may become
determinative evidence.
Article 963 of the Civil Code found under the title of Succes-
sions contains the following language:
"With regard to the proofs necessary to establish the exist-
ence of the child at the moment of its birth, it must not be
determined that it was born alive by the simple palpitations
of its members, but by its respiration, or by other signs which
demonstrate its existence."
The definition of "Live Birth" given in Act 180 of 1942 upon which
designated persons are to depend in registering births and deaths
is set forth as follows:
"'Live birth' means a birth in which the child shows evidence
of life after complete birth. A birth is complete when the child
is entirely outside the mother, even if the cord is uncut and
the placenta still attached. The words 'evidence of life' include
heart action, breathing, or movement of voluntary muscles."
(j) Legitimation (Article 198).
Article 198 of the Civil Code deals with legitimation of a child
by the subsequent marriage of its parents, provides that inces-
tuous and adulterous illegitimates may not be legitimated and
that the child must have been "legally acknowledged" by the par-
ents either before their marriage by an act passed before a notary
and two witnesses, or by their contract of marriage itself.
In Act 180 of 1942 in Section 23 dealing with legitimation is
found the following statement:
"In case of the legitimation of any child by subsequent mar-
riage of its parents, the State Registrar, upon receipt of a certi-
fied copy of the marriage certificate of the parents, together
with a statement of the husband acknowledging paternity,
shall prepare a new certificate of birth in the new name of the
child so legitimated."
Section 12 of the act announces the "Evidentiary Character of the
Certificate":
"Each certificate, as provided for in this act, filed within
six months after the time prescribed for their filing, shall be
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Data pertaining
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to the father of a child are such evidence, if the alleged father
is or becomes, the husband of the mother in a legal marriage;
if not, the data pertaining to the father of a child are not such
evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding adverse to the
interest of the alleged father, or of his heirs, devisees, or other
successors in interest, if the paternity is controverted."
Since the supreme court of the state has so wisely declared
that for purposes of inheritance by the child that informal ac-
knowledgment is as good as formal acknowledgment, 1 it has been
the hope of socially minded students of the law that the court
might declare informal acknowledgment before marriage suffi-
cient to satisfy Article 198, if and when such a case is presented to
them. They have already slightly broadened the letter of 198 by
declaring an acknowledgment to the priest performing the mar-
riage ceremony sufficient to constitute a valid legitimation.12
The provisions for certification seem to follow the desired
trend and may be helpful because of their evidentiary character.
(k) Adoption (Article 214. Also see A Compilation of Louisi-
ana Statutes Related to the Civil Code, pp. 56-74.)
Act 154 of 1942 again rewrote the adoption law and specifi-
cally repealed Act 428 of 193812 which rewrote the law and re-
pealed 233 of 193614 and laws on the same subject matter. This
act only covers procedure for adopting children under seventeen
and leaves Act 169 of 1940 intact, outlining adoption procedure
for persons over seventeen.
In general the procedure is the same as that of the 1938 act-
presentation of petition to the judge of the juvenile court, visita-
tions, reports, et cetera, by the State Department of Public Wel-
fare. Slightly more power and discretion is vested in the judge
of the juvenile court to extend or cut the time in some instances,
to make his own investigation without awaiting a report from
the Welfare Department in some instances, et cetera. The petition
may be presented apparently to any one of three juvenile courts-
that having jurisdiction over (1) the child to be adopted, (2) the
domicile of the person or agency having legal control of the child,
or (3) the domicile of the adoptive parents. The 1938 act pro-
vided for but the first and third situations.
11. Mother: Taylor v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 91 So. 645 (1922). Father: Succes-
sion of Corsey, 171 La. 663, 131 So. 841 (1931).
12. Succession of Roach, 155 La. 541, 99 So. 442 (1924).
13. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4839.26-4839.41.
14. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4839.10-4839.25.
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The prescribed content of the petition remains practically the
same with the additional requisite that any relationship between
the petitioner and child be disclosed. Furthermore, if the child
had been legally surrendered in favor of any social agency, the
name and address of the agency should be substituted for that
of the parents or tutor of the child. In cases where the parents
cannot be located, service upon a curator-ad-hoc for the parents
is provided for in addition to service on the individual or agency
having physical custody of the child.
A very important addition to the law clarifying a trouble-
some situation is found in Section 2 of the new act. Under the
previous law very properly requiring the consent of both spouses
in the event of adoption by a married couple and of course re-
quiring the consent of the parent of the child, no exception was
made for the rather frequent case of adoption of the offspring of
a first marriage by the second husband or wife of one of the par-
ents. Thus the anomalous situation was presented of converting
the lawful parent of a child into an adopting parent only, to which
obviously no one concerned cared to subscribe. The following
proviso of the new act takes care of such a contingency:
"... provided that in the event that one of the spouses is
the lawful parent of the child to be adopted, then the other
spouse may 'adopt said child with the consent of the lawful
parent who need not join in the petition and no judgment of
adoption awarded to the said other spouse shall in any way be
construed to alter the relation of the child to said lawful
parent."
In Act 428 of 1938, Section 6, is found this sentence:
"Upon the entry of the final order of adoption, the said child
shall cease to be heir of its parents, whose obligations toward
it for support shall also cease, and the child shall at the same
time become an heir of its adoptive parents to the extent pro-
vided by existing law."
This statement has been deleted from the new act leaving the
matter of inheritance a thing apart from this statute dealing with
the adoption procedure.
If we take the subject matter of inheritance by adopted chil-
dren not to be the same as that dealing with the matter of who
can adopt, who may be adopted and how this may be legally ac-
complished, a logical deduction surely, then all that appears to
remain on the subject matter of rights of inheritance are these
1942]
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statements in Article 214: "but such adoption shall not interfere
with the rights of forced heirs." "The person adopted shall have
all the rights of a legitimate child in the estate of the person
adopting him, except as above stated." Many most interesting
problems of inheritance are still open and left, perhaps wisely,
to the courts. Article 950 of the Code states that "incapacity of
heirs is the absence of those qualities required in order to inherit
at the moment the succession is opened. . . ." Doubtless, then,
the incapacity of an adopted child to be an heir of his parents
after final adoption by others, declared by Act 428 of 1938 and
now repealed, will be immaterial should a person adopted under
the 1938 act present a claim to the succession of his parent, dying
since the adoption of the 1942 act.
Section 14 of the new act sets a limit of six months from the
effective date of the statute within which an action for annulment
of any adoption may be brought, grounded in lack of jurisdiction,
defect in procedure, or invalidity of statute.
Another desirable change made by the new act permits com-
pletion of the adoption to be achieved more quickly where the
child has been in the home of those desiring to adopt him for a
year or longer, and there has been no objection made to the grant-,
ing of the preliminary decree. 5 The number of visits by repre-
sentatives of the Child Welfare Division of the Department of
Public Welfare has been reduced to two, thus slightly relieving a
sadly burdened department. Observation of the child in the new
home by some trained and responsible person is a matter of such
paramount importance for both the child and the adopting par-
ents that it is most unfortunate that those most deeply concerned
do not always realize the necessity of this safeguard and are irri-
tated by, rather than grateful for, this protection given by the law
to them and the child.
(1) Registration of adoptions.
Provisions for the safeguarding of information pertaining to
the adopted child are found in at least four acts of the 1942 legis-
lature. Act 428 of 1938, Section 10,16 provided that the clerk of
court should send a certified copy of the final decree to the regis-
trar of vital statistics in the place of the adoptive parents' domi-
cile, and that the registrar should cause a new record of birth to
be made. It was further made the duty of the registrar to seal and
15. See Wilson, Social Welfare Legislation-1942 (1942) 1 Conference Com-
ments, no. 2, p. 1.
16. See Louisiana State Law Institute, op. cit. supra note 4, at 26, 72.'
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file the original birth certificate together with the adoptive de-
cree, and opening this package was forbidden except "upon the
demand of the said adopted child or his real or adoptive parents,
the State Department of Public Welfare through the Commission-
er of Public Welfare, or by order of a court of record." This provi-
sion is carried forward by Section 10 of Act 154 of 1942 with sev-
eral changes. The Central Bureau of Vital Statistics of the Louisi-
ana State Department (Board) of Health or its successor must be
the recipient of the decree. The breaking of the package is prohib-
ited except on demand of the same list, but even then only on or-
der of court. If no original certificate of birth is found, then the
Bureau shall file a new certificate of birth but may require "addi-
tional documentary evidence necessary to establish the circum-
stances of birth, which would have been recorded in the original
birth record."
Section 11 of the new act also provides for private hearings
and records of the court proceedings.
Act 180 of 1942 authorizes the creation of "a central Divi-
sion of Public Health Statistics for the purpose of securing com-
plete data pertaining to births, legitimations, adoptions, deaths,
stillbirths, morbidity, marriages, divorces and annulments of mar-
riages." Section 22 of this act repeats the fundamentals of Sec-
tion 10 of the adoption act in regard to registration of adoptions,
sealing of packages, et cetera.
Act 342 of 1942 authorizes the Central Bureau of Vital
Statistics to receive certified copies of final decrees of adoption
from other states and territories of the United States where the
original births are on record in Louisiana and issue new certifi-
cates of birth as provided by the adoption act.
This statute greatly amplifies the provisions of 234 of 194017
in most respects. However, the latter provides for receipt and
recordation of adoption decrees by other states or foreign coun-
tries.
Act 343 of 1942 amending and reenacting Act 269 of 1940.11
Act 269 of 1940 provided for the making of a new record by
the Central Bureau of Vital Statistics of those adoptions prior to
the effective date of 428 of 1938 by submitting a copy of the birth
certificate of the individual together with copy of the judgment
17. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 3468.6. Also see Louisiana State Law Insti-
tute, op. cit. supra note 4, at 74.
18. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) §§ 3468.4-3468.5. Also see Louisiana State
Law Institute, op. cit. supra note 4, at 75.
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or notarial act showing adoption, and the Bureau was then to fol-
low the general procedure outlined for recordation of adoptions
under the 1938 act, including the sealing of the package, et cetera.
Act 343 of 1942 changed this act of 1940 to the extent of adding
after Central Bureau of Vital Statistics the words "or the Regis-
trars of Vital Statistics of the various parishes, including the City
of New Orleans." The words act of adoption are used instead of
notarial act of adoption.
It will be observed that in three of these new acts, the Cen-
tral Bureau of Vital Statistics is referred to, while in the fourth
the Board of Health is instructed to create a Central Division of
Public Health Statistics which will perform these duties of recor-
dation, certification, et cetera. Power is vested in the State Board
of Health to enforce the act except in the Parish and City of
New Orleans.
(m) Servitudes.
(1) (Articles 646, 660, 822, and Act 180 of 1906. Also see
Compilation of Louisiana Statutes Related to the Civil Code,
p. 164.)
Act 97 of 1942 authorizes police juries to close and dam small
canals in streams not under the jurisdiction of the United States
when such action might be thought a necessary protection to
health or property. Written approval must be secured from the
State Department of Public Works and from the Board of Com-
missioners of the Levee District if the contemplated dam should
be located in such a district.
(2) (Article 452). In the interest of public safety and with
particular reference to conditions obtaining during a war period,
Act 117 of 1942 was passed to provide "rules and regulations con-
cerning the use of docks, wharves, piers, the batture, banks and
shores of all navigable waters" in Louisiana.
(3) Act 283 of 1942 prohibits the state from issuing permits
to prospect for minerals on any lands over which they possess any
right or control less than full ownership without the consent of
the owners of abutting property.
(n) Cancellation of Records (See Of the Erasure of Mort-
gages, Articles 3371-3386. Also see A Compilation of Louisiana
Statutes Related to the Civil Code, p. 649, and Act 255 of 1936.)
Act 227 of 1942 provides that a prescribed or preempted "lien,
mortgage, privilege or encumbrance of any kind" may be can-
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celled from the record by the Clerk of Court of any parish but
New Orleans upon the filing of a sworn written request by any
interested party.
(o) Prescription (Articles 3457-3556. Also see A Compilation
of Louisiana Statutes Related to the Civil Code, p. 655 et sequor.)
Act 88 of 194219 lays down a maximum period of five years
from the rendition of account within which a depositer may ques-
tion a bank regarding his statement.
Act 140 of 1942 provides that in the six months following
the effective date of the act no person holding a land warrant of
any kind may locate on state lands. This act is made applicable to
"minors, interdicts, absentees and others now excepted by law."
Those persons "serving in the active branches of the armed forces
of the United States" who have bona fide ownership of such war-
rant at the time of entry into the service or who inherit while in
service, are given a year after peace is declared "with all the
nations with whom the United States is now at war."
Act 141 of 1942 is identical with Act 140 except that "warrants
issued under the provisions of Act 104 of 1888 "120 are specifically
covered instead of state land warrants in general.
C. MINERAL RIGHTS
Besides taxation statutes, which are not within the scope of
this discussion, there are several acts of 1942 which might be
mentioned here. All of them deal, however, with state lands and
really have no proper place in this resume as they more properly
belong in a discussion of administrative law. Act 77 of 1942
authorizes the state and its- agencies to "execute and fix the terms
and duration of permits, leases or servitudes of which the grantor
has title, custody or possession for directional (deviation from
vertical) drilling of wells in search of oil, gas, sulphur, and other
minerals which may underlie the beds of adjacent . .. bodies of
water," and to give permits for pipe laying and other types of en-
deavor necessary in pursuing the search for minerals. These per-
mits are to be granted only for approach to the beds of streams
upon which Valid leases have been obtained, of course. The five
year limitation found in Act 170 of 194021 is not to apply.
19. Art. 3540, La. Civil Code of 1870. See also Louisiana State Law Insti-
tute, op. cit. supra note 4, at 667.
20. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 7291-7294.
21. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) 9 7317.5.
1971942]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Act 92 of 1942 authorizes the state to lease the bed of White
Lake in Vermilion Parish, title of which is in dispute. The pur-
pose of the act was to avoid litigation. The Acadia-Vermilion
Rice Irrigation Company, Inc., the affairs of which are under the
administration of the State Bank Examiner, was claimant with
the state, and the act recites that the Company agreed that mu-
tual protection might be achieved as producers would not lease
because of the questionable title. The act is termed an emergency
bill due to shortness of time remaining in which materials for
development might be obtained.
Act 152 of 1942 amends and reenacts Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6
of Act 77 of 194022 dealing with geophysical surveys. Section 3 is
amended by making it mandatory for those persons who have ob-
tained survey permits to disclose their information upon request
only after they may have obtained a lease from the state. The
former thirty day period after request, if such a period has
elapsed since completion of the survey, is lengthened to ninety
days. The Commissioner of Conservation as well as the State
Mineral Board may make the request for disclosure.
The amendment to Section 4 of Act 77 of 1940 makes it neces-
sary for a survey permit to be secured from the Department of
Conservation and the State Mineral Board, and Section 5 makes
the contents of reports of the survey confidential with the Depart-
ment of Conservation and the State Mineral Board. Section 6 of
Act 77 of 1940 is amended by making the maximum fine for viola-
tion of the act $1000 instead of $5000.
Act 283 of 1942 expresses a limitation on the state's power to
issue prospecting permits and was mentioned above under the
section on Servitudes.
Section'9 of Act 93 of 193623 is amended by Act 153 of 1942
which gives to the State Mineral Board the power to amend state
leases within certain limits, and specifically to pool and unitize
state leases under the detailed terms of the statute.
22. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) §§ 4719.11-4719.14.
23. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4725.9.
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